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The	Economy	and	the	Unpopular	Incumbent
DURING	ELECTIONS,	DISCUSSIONS	IN	THE	PRESS	AND	AMONG	pundits	focus	on	the	role	of	the
candidates,	their	strategies,	and	messages	in	securing	the	votes	needed	to	assume	the	White
House.	Polls	chronicle	the	incumbent	president’s	standing	and	report	which	issues	voters
consider	paramount.	There	is	ample	talk	about	national	conditions,	as	well	as	progress	or	lack
thereof	in	wars.	News	accounts	feature	indicators	of	the	health	of	the	economy,	such	as	the
unemployment	rate,	housing	starts,	the	GDP,	the	Dow,	and,	in	2008,	gas	prices	and	foreclosure
rates.	Political	conventions	remind	voters	of	a	candidate’s	ties	to	a	political	party,	a	notion
capable	of	activating	a	complex	amalgam	of	information,	inferences,	and	inclinations	among
those	who	consider	themselves	political	kin	of	FDR,	JFK,	and	Clinton	or	Reagan,	and	perhaps
George	W.	Bush.
Before	asking	how	messages,	media,	and	money	shaped	the	2008	general	election
campaign,	we	focus	here	on	the	supposition	that	a	combination	of	fundamental	factors	ensured
that	in	2008	the	stars	were	aligned	for	the	Democrats.	Among	them,	the	incumbent	Republican
president	was	unpopular,	the	premises	of	the	war	that	he	had	launched	in	Iraq	discredited,	and
the	economy	faltering.	In	party	identification,	the	Democrats	held	the	advantage.	On	handling
the	economy—the	issue	mattering	most	to	voters—they	had	the	edge	as	well.
We	begin	by	documenting	George	W.	Bush’s	subterranean	polling	numbers,	move	to	note
that	leading	indicators	suggested	an	economy	on	the	wrong	track,	proceed	to	note	that	on
handling	the	economy	the	Democrats	had	the	advantage,	and	conclude	by	showing	that	the
electorate	was	populated	with	higher	numbers	of	Democratic	than	Republican	identifiers.
After	exploring	the	blessings	this	bundle	of	factors	bestowed	on	the	eventual	Democratic
nominee,	we	set	the	stage	for	our	argument	that	message,	media,	and	money	nonetheless
contributed	to	Obama’s	ballot	total	by	isolating	the	percentage	of	the	2008	presidential	vote
intention	that	can	be	predicted	by	party	preference,	ideological	placement,	economic
conditions,	and	disapproval	of	the	presidency	of	George	W.	Bush	alone.*
An	Unpopular	President
President	George	W.	Bush	was	the	albatross	circling	the	candidacy	of	Republican	nominee
John	McCain.	Not	since	Hubert	Humphrey	in	1968	had	a	presidential	candidate	so	desperately
needed	to	decouple	his	fortunes	from	those	of	his	party’s	incumbent.	Bush’s	“job	approval	is
almost	as	poor	as	that	of	King	George	III	among	the	colonists	240	years	ago,”1	posited	Peter
Brown,	assistant	director	of	the	Quinnipiac	University	Polling	Institute	in	late	March	2008.
“The	failure	of	the	Bush	presidency	is	the	dominant	fact	of	American	politics	today,”	observed
Jeffrey	Bell	in	the	Weekly	Standard	that	same	month.	“It	has	driven	every	facet	of	Democratic
political	strategy	since	early	2006,	when	Democrats	settled	on	the	campaign	themes	that
brought	them	their	takeover	of	the	House	and	Senate	in	November	2006.	Nothing—not	even	the
success	of	the	American	troop	surge	in	Iraq—has	altered	or	will	alter	the	centrality	of	George
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W. Bush	and	his	failed	presidency	to	Democratic	planning	in	the	remainder	of	2008.”2
At	no	point	in	2008	did	a	major	public	opinion	poll	find	more	than	43	percent	of	the	public
approving	of	the	incumbent’s	presidency.3	As	2008	was	drawing	to	a	close,	a	survey
conducted	by	the	Pew	Research	Center	found	that	“just	11%	said	Bush	will	be	remembered	as
an	outstanding	or	above	average	president—by	far	the	lowest	positive	end-of-term	rating	for
any	of	the	past	four	presidents.”4	The	25	percent	at	which	the	43rd	president’s	approval
ratings	landed	on	October	5,	noted	an	article	in	the	National	Journal,	was	“only	1-percentage
point	higher	than	President	Nixon’s	low	of	24	percent,	reached	shortly	before	he	resigned,	and
3	points	above	President	Truman’s	low	of	22	percent.”5
On	average	from	mid-December	2007	through	Election	Day	2008,	Bush	scored	3.8	on	a
10-point	NAES	favorability	scale.6	Were	the	presidency	a	college	course,	one	would	be	hard-
pressed	to	read	this	as	a	pass.	Related	measures	told	the	same	story.	During	the	general
election,	77	percent	believed	the	country	was	“seriously	off	on	the	wrong	track.”7
When	asked	about	the	incumbent,	voters	served	up	a	wide	range	of	both	conventional	and
unexpected	language	expressing	dismay	and	disdain.	On	May	12,	2008,	for	example,	an
Annenberg-sponsored	focus	group8	of	undecided	independents	in	Charlottesville,	Virginia,
responded	to	moderator	Peter	Hart’s	request	for	“a	word	or	phrase	to	describe	your	opinion	of
George	Bush	as	president”	by	saying:
DANNY:	Disappointing.
DORITA:	That	was	my	word,	too.	Exact	word.	I’m	thinking,	okay,	yes.	I	was
expecting	more.
SUSAN:	Well,	I	don’t	like	to	be	disrespectful	of	the	president,	but	I	think	he’s
worthless.
NOLA:	Not	surprising.
BOB:	Misleading.
MONIQUE:	Awful.
DOLORES:	Can	a	toilet	brush	go	with	a	toilet	.	.	.	I	don’t	want	to	be	disrespectful
either.	I’m	going	to	say	scary.
DENNIS:	I	just	say	he’s	in	a	difficult	position.
WILLIAM:	I	think	he’s	very	gullible.
JOSH:	Solitary.
PATRICK:	War	monger.
MELINDA:	I	don’t	know.	I	don’t	know	what	to	say.	I	don’t	have	one	word.	All	I
know	is	I	wouldn’t	want	to	be	in	his	shoes.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
0.
 O
xf
or
d 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 P
re
ss
 U
S
A
 -
 O
S
O
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
Four	months	later,	a	focus	group	of	citizens	in	Bedford,	New	Hampshire,	offered	answers
no	more	likely	to	gladden	the	43rd	president’s	heart:
TOM:	Incompetent.
SHANNON:	Illiterate.
DAVID:	Blew	it.
JOAN:	Scary.
KATHY:	.	.	.	disappointed.
BILL:	Unqualified	and	incompetent.
ELIZABETH:	Embarrassing.
EMILY:	That’s	what	I	was	going	to	say,	embarrassing.
JANE:	I	was	going	to	say	sympathy.9
The	implications	were	not	lost	on	the	Republican	ticket.	“We’re	up	against	a	lot,”	noted
McCain’s	running	mate,	Governor	Sarah	Palin	of	Alaska,	in	an	interview	with	NBC’s	Brian
Williams	on	October	24.	“We’re	up	against	a	very	unpopular	president,	Bush’s	administration
right	now,	and	those	who	want	to	link	us	to	that	administration.”10
A	Faltering	Economy
As	the	presidential	candidates	assembled	for	their	preprimary	debates	in	fall	2007,	the	Dow
was	setting	records,	peaking	in	early	October	at	14,164.11	Still,	the	country	was	anxious.	In	a
Wall	Street	Journal/NBC	News	poll	taken	at	the	time,	three-quarters	of	respondents	reported
that	the	nation	was	on	the	wrong	track.	By	the	eve	of	the	second	general	election	presidential
debate	a	year	later,	the	Dow	had	lost	more	than	4,000	points	to	close	on	October	7,	2008,	at
9,447.	And	the	bottom	wasn’t	in	sight.
Where	in	the	third	quarter,	the	GDP	growth	was	minus	one-half	of	1	percent,12	in	the
fourth,	the	contraction	rate	was	negative	6.2	percent.13	Put	simply,	the	economic	quarter	that
included	the	last	five	weeks	of	the	election	was	dismal.14	Harking	back	to	the	early	1980s,	an
account	in	the	Wall	Street	Journal	characterized	the	U.S.	economy’s	performance	in	the
closing	months	of	2008	as	“its	worst	.	.	.	in	a	quarter-century	.	.	.	”15	In	that	period,	business
sales	plunged	and	consumer	spending	dropped	at	a	rate	“marking	the	worst	back-to-back
declines	since	quarterly	records	began	in	1947.”16
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FIGURE	1.1	University	of	Michigan’s	Consumer	Sentiment	Index.	Sources:	Survey	of
Consumers,	Reuters,	and	University	of	Michigan,	http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/
Nor	were	other	economic	indicators	reassuring.	In	the	fourth	quarter	of	2008,
“[h]omebuilding	tumbled	at	a	23.6%	pace,	and	commercial	real	estate	started	to	crumble.	As
federal	spending	rose,	state	and	local	governments	[were]	pulling	back.	Exports	growth	fell	at
a	nearly	20%	rate.”17
The	other	news	for	individuals	was	troubling	as	well.	“Personal	income	decreased	1.2
percent	for	the	quarter.”18	Because	scholars	peg	electoral	outcome	from	inferences	based
largely	on	gains	or	losses	in	personal	income	and	the	popularity	of	the	president,	the	drop	in
income	was	especially	noteworthy.	If	past	is	prologue,	the	University	of	Michigan	Consumer
Sentiment	Index	also	forecast	a	script	that	ended	with	Barack	Obama	in	the	White	House.
Driven	by	a	collapse	in	housing	prices	and	a	dramatic	fall	in	the	stock	market,	consumer
confidence	in	fall	2008	was	plummeting.
“When	the	party	in	power	wins,	the	Michigan	consumer	sentiment	index	is	at	least	96,”
recalled	McCain	pollster	Bill	McInturff.	“The	three	times	it’s	been	in	the	’70s,	the	party	in
power	has	lost:	Jimmy	Carter,	Gerry	Ford	and	George	H.W.	Bush	in	’92.	In	October	[2008]
the	number	was	58.	In	other	words,	there’s	not	a	number	like	this.	When	you	look	at	those
numbers,	you	conclude	that	we’re	going	to	lose	the	election”19	(figure	1.1).
A	Democratic	Advantage	on	Handling	the	Economy
At	the	very	beginning	of	the	election	season,	Iraq	surpassed	the	economy	as	the	issue	most	saw
as	the	central	concern	facing	the	country.	But	its	position	at	the	top	of	the	list	was	shortlived.
Thereafter,	the	focal	issue	was	the	economy	writ	large	(figure	1.2).	NAES	data	tell	us	that	the
economy	was	the	most	important	issue	for	respondents	regardless	of	their	race,	gender,	age,
education,	political	identification,	and	so	on.*
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Even	before	the	first	Iowa	voter	braved	the	ice	and	snow	to	caucus,	the	issue	landscape
looked	sunny	and	cloud-free	for	the	Democrats.	“The	Republican	Party	was	in	a	much	stronger
position	on	issues	in	January	2004,	10	months	before	President	George	W.	Bush	won	re-
election	and	the	Republicans	retained	their	majority	position	in	Congress,”	noted	a
November/December	2007	Gallup	Poll	report.20	When	asked	which	party	could	better	handle
the	situation	in	Iraq,	the	public	had	shifted	from	preferring	the	Republicans	by	16	percent	in
2004	to	favoring	the	Democrats	by	10	in	late	2007.	On	the	economy,	the	Democratic	advantage
had	risen	from	4	percent	to	12	in	the	same	period,	and	on	health	care	from	21	to	30	percent.
Even	on	taxes,	an	issue	the	Republicans	had	owned	in	the1980s,	the	Democrats	and
Republicans	were	basically	at	parity	both	in	2004	(when	the	Democrats	were	up	4)	and	in	late
2007	(when	they	were	ahead	by	2).
FIGURE	1.2	Percent	of	Respondents	Who	Cited	“Iraq	War/Terrorism”	and	the	“Economy”	as	the
Most	Important	Problem	(5-day	PMA).	Source:	NAES08	telephone	survey.
The	Economy
After	looking	back	at	its	measures	since	1982,	Gallup	concluded	in	late	2007	that	its	“long-
term	trend	for	which	party	can	better	handle	the	economy	finds	the	Democrats	doing	well	on	a
historical	basis.”21	The	country’s	oldest	polling	firm	then	offered	an	ominous	forecast	for	the
Republicans.	“[W]hile	it	is	not	unusual	for	the	Republicans	to	be	at	parity	with	or	behind	the
Democrats	on	this	measure,	their	current	12-point	deficit	is	on	the	high	side.	If	a	disadvantage
this	large	persists	in	2008,	it	could	spell	trouble	for	the	party	if	the	economy	figures	as	a	major
issue	for	voters.”22	In	February	2008,	Pew	confirmed	that	“a	majority	(53%)	.	.	.	says	the
Democrats	are	better	able	to	handle	the	economy,	which	has	become	the	leading	issue	in	the
presidential	campaign.”23	In	every	head-to-head	comparison	in	the	Washington	Post/ABC
survey	between	March	and	Election	Day	2008,	Obama	topped	McCain	on	this	issue.24	Not
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since	the	Dukakis-Bush	race	of	1988	had	the	Post-ABC	poll	showed	a	Republican	outpacing
the	Democrat	on	this	question	as	Election	Day	neared.25	Throughout	the	general	election
season,	data	from	the	NAES	show	an	Obama	advantage	on	the	perceptions	of	which	candidate
would	best	handle	the	economy	as	well	(figure	1.3).
FIGURE	1.3	Perceptions	of	Which	Candidate	Would	Handle	the	Economy	Better	(5-day	PMA).
Source:	NAES08	telephone	survey.
A	Democratic	Advantage	in	Party	Identification
The	disposition	of	individuals	to	tell	a	pollster	that	they	were	Republicans	began	dissipating
after	the	2004	election	(figure	1.4).
The	effects	of	a	frustrating	war,	faltering	economy,	and	failing	president	are	reflected	in
the	outcome	of	the	2006	election,	which	flipped	control	of	both	the	U.S.	House	and	Senate	to
the	Democrats	and	spiked	the	number	of	voters	calling	themselves	Democrats.	That	shift
continued	into	the	2008	election.	In	2004,	a	Pew	survey	found	33	percent	identified	as
Republicans	and	35	percent	as	Democrats.	In	2008,	27	percent	were	self-described
Republicans	and	36	percent	self-identified	as	Democrats.	The	2008	NAES	produced	similar
results	(26.7	percent	Republicans,	36.1	Democrats).26
In	the	contest	to	sign	up	adherents,	the	Democrats	handily	bested	those	on	the	other	side	as
well.	Almost	74	percent	(73.5)	of	those	eligible	were	registered	by	Election	Day—an
increase	of	10.1	million.	While	from	2004	to	the	end	of	2008	Democratic	registration
increased	1.4	percent,	or	2,916,000	million,	during	the	same	period,	the	Republicans	tallied
only	half	that	amount	(1,458,000).27
Of	course,	identification	doesn’t	necessarily	translate	into	election	of	the	advantaged
party’s	presidential	nominee.	“[T]he	Republican	Party	apparently	enjoyed	a	party-
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identification	advantage	among	actual	voters	(that	is,	nonvoters	are	omitted)	in	all	contests
from	1904	through	1932,	and	the	Democrats	an	advantage	in	all	contests	from	1936	through
2000,”	notes	political	scientist	David	Mayhew.	“Yet	in	only	fourteen	of	these	twenty-five
instances	did	the	party	that	actually	won	the	presidency	enjoy	a	party-identification	edge
among	voters	at	the	time.	Coin	flips	would	have	brought	twelve	and	a	half	such	victories,
barely	a	worse	showing.”28
FIGURE	1.4	Trends	in	Party	Identification,	2000	to	2008.	Source:	Pew	Research	Center	for	the
People	&	the	Press,	“Fewer	Voters	Identify	as	Republicans.	Democrats	Now	Have	the
Advantage	in	‘Swing’	States,”	March	20,	2008	(http://pewresearch.org/pubs/773/fewer-
voters-identify-as-republicans).
One	explanation	may	be	that	voters	sometimes	consider	the	other	party’s	nominee	an
ideological	kin.	If	so,	Obama’s	party	identification	and	voter	registration	surplus	might	be
trumped	by	McCain’s	ideological	advantage.	In	2008,	38.4	percent	of	those	surveyed	by	the
NAES	(by	telephone)	said	they	were	very	or	somewhat	conservative,	while	only	26	percent
said	they	were	very	or	somewhat	liberal.29	This	trend	has	proven	durable;	the	share	of
Americans	calling	itself	liberal,	moderate,	or	conservative	has	remained	stable	for	decades.
This	was	true	even	as	the	Democratic	Party	identification	advantage	was	widening.30
According	to	the	NAES	data,	Democrats	and	independents	are	less	ideologically
predictable	than	their	Republican	counterparts.*	Sixty-eight	percent	of	self-identified
Republicans	consider	themselves	conservative,	compared	to	the	42	percent	of	Democrats	who
see	themselves	as	liberal.	However	in	our	data,	party	identification	is	a	slightly	stronger
predictor	of	how	a	person	will	vote	than	ideology,	adding	weight	to	the	Obama	party
advantage.31
Still	all	of	this	raises	the	question:	how	did	a	person	widely	perceived	to	be	liberal
(figure	1.5)	win	the	votes	of	conservatives?
The	cross-ideological	draw	of	the	senator	from	Illinois	was	stronger	than	that	of	the
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Republican	Party	nominee.*	Not	only	did	the	Democrat	do	better	with	self-identified	liberals
than	McCain	did	with	self-identified	conservatives,	but	he	decisively	carried	moderates.
Similar	to	our	data,	exit	polls	showed	that	20	percent	of	conservatives	voted	for	Obama.	The
Illinois	senator	also	carried	a	majority	of	those	who	considered	themselves	to	be	neither
Republicans	nor	Democrats	but	independents.	Still,	both	candidates	carried	over	85	percent	of
those	who	identified	with	their	own	party.32
Using	the	2008	NAES	phone	postelection	panel	data	to	compare	the	17.4	percent	of
conservatives	voting	for	Obama	against	other	conservatives,	we	find	that	those	for	the
Democratic	ticket	were	significantly	more	likely	to	be	black,	Hispanic,	lower	income,	and
inclined	to	believe	that	their	personal	economic	situation	had	worsened	in	the	past	year.*	The
largest	and	most	robust	predictor	in	our	statistical	model	is	race.	Among	conservatives,	blacks
are	40.79	times	more	likely	to	vote	for	Obama	than	nonblacks.	In	our	postelection	survey	over
85	percent	of	black	conservatives	reported	voting	for	Obama.
FIGURE	1.5	Perceptions	of	Candidate	Ideology.	Sources:	NAES00	telephone	survey,	6/01/00	to
Election	Day,	N	=	38,764;	NAES04	telephone	survey,	6/01/04	to	Election	Day,	N	=	40,898;
NAES08	telephone	survey,	6/01/08	to	Election	Day;	N	=	25,654.
In	electoral	college	terms,	these	shifts	meant	that	liberal	Obama	took	back	states	that	had
been	won	by	centrist	Clinton	in	1992	and/or	1996	but	had	been	taken	by	Bush	in	2000	and/or
2004:	Colorado,	Florida,	Iowa,	Nevada,	New	Mexico,	and	Ohio.	Obama	did	not	win	some
states	won	by	Clinton,	including	Arkansas	(home	to	Clinton),	Tennessee	(home	to	Gore)	and
West	Virginia,	but	picked	up	states	Clinton	did	not	carry:	Virginia,	North	Carolina,	and
Indiana.	The	fact	that	McCain	contested	Pennsylvania	to	the	end	indicates	how	difficult	his
task	was.	Pennsylvania	has	been	won	by	the	Democratic	presidential	nominee	since	1992.	Of
the	states	that	Bush	won	in	2004,	Obama	recaptured	nine:	Colorado,	Florida,	Indiana,	Iowa,
New	Mexico,	Nevada,	North	Carolina,	Ohio,	and	Virginia.
Unsurprisingly,	voters	did	not	necessarily	pull	the	same	party’s	lever	in	the	voting	booth	in
2008	as	they	had	in	2004.	In	the	2008	NAES	postelection	panel,	17	percent	of	respondents
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who	said	that	they	voted	for	incumbent	president	George	W.	Bush	in	2004	reported	balloting
for	Obama,	while	7.6	percent	who	said	that	they	voted	for	Democratic	Senator	John	Kerry	in
2004	did	the	same	for	Senator	McCain,	a	net	advantage	of	almost	10	percent	for	the
Democrats.	Moreover	in	2008,	Democratic	turnout	was	up	and	Republican	down.	This	proved
particularly	important	in	North	Carolina	and	Virginia,	which	both	moved	to	Obama’s	column.
Party,	Ideology,	Incumbency,	and	the	Economy	in	Predicting	the	2008	Vote
Scholars	of	politics	have	found	that	economic	growth	and	the	incumbent’s	popularity	account
for	most	of	the	variance	in	presidential	vote.33	The	predictions	are	less	reliable	when	the	so-
called	fundamentals	do	not	dramatically	tilt	in	one	direction	or	the	other;34	when	the	country	is
at	war,	as	was	the	case	in	1952	and	1968;35or,	as	Gore’s	failure	in	2000	suggests,	when	one
campaign	neglects	to	do	something	the	models	presuppose,	such	as	claiming	credit	for
prosperity	that	occurred	when	the	candidate’s	party	controlled	the	White	House.36
In	most	years,	forecasts	modeled	by	political	scientists	have	been	accurate	within	a
percent	or	two37	and	as	we	noted	earlier	the	forecasters	anticipated	a	clear	Democratic
victory	in	2008.	In	retrospect,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	McCain	advisors	could	not	conjure	up
a	plan	that	might	have	taken	them	to	victory	because	their	assessment	was	on	the	same	page	as
the	forecasters.	In	lay	terms,	a	faltering	economy	and	an	unpopular	incumbent	predict	a	win	for
the	party	peering	at	the	White	House	from	outside	the	wrought	iron	gates	on	Pennsylvania
Avenue.
Here	we	replicate	these	assumptions	as	best	as	our	survey	questions	permit,	using	the
2008	telephone	NAES	postelection	panel	to	see	how	well	party	identification,	ideological
placement,	incumbent	approval	rating	and	economic	perceptions	predict	vote	in	2008.	Table
1.1	outlines	a	probit	regression	model	predicting	an	Obama	two-party	vote.	The	predictor
variables	in	the	model38	are	party	identification,	ideology,	voting	for	Bush	in	2004,	Bush
approval	ratings,	the	belief	that	the	national	economy	is	worse	than	a	year	ago,	and	the	belief
that	personal	economy	is	worse	than	a	year	ago.	These	last	two	variables	are	often	thought	of
as	sociotropic	voting	and	pocketbook	voting.39	The	dependent	variable	in	the	model	is	from
the	postelection	wave	of	the	panel	while	the	predictor	variables	come	from	the	pre-election
wave.
We	apologize	for	the	use	of	terms	such	as	“explained	variance,”	which	is	the	percentage	of
variability	in	a	dependent	variable,	that	is,	an	Obama	vote	that	can	be	statistically	attributed	to
independent	variables.	For	a	simple	example,	knowing	a	person’s	birthday	can	explain	his	or
her	age	by	100	percent.	Knowing	a	person’s	eating	habits	may	only	partially	explain	his	or	her
body	mass	index	(BMI),	since	other	variables,	such	as	genetics,	physical	activity,	and	so	on,
can	explain	other	variance	in	BMI.
Examining	explained	variance	allows	us	to	see	how	much	of	an	impact	these	fundamental
variables	have	on	vote	decisions.	Therefore,	the	first	statistic	of	note	is	the	McKelvey	and
Zavoina	R2,	which	estimates	the	variance	in	our	dependent	variable	explained	collectively	by
our	independent	variables.40	It	suggests	that	77	percent	of	the	variance	in	the	Obama	two-party
vote	variable	is	explained	by	these	few	variables.	When	one	adds	to	this	finding	the	fact	that
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Obama	outspent	McCain	and	ran	a	better	campaign,	the	likelihood	that	he	would	win	was	high.
In	the	chapters	that	follow,	we	will	factor	the	power	of	campaign	messages	into	our
explanation.	Then,	in	chapter	12,	we	will	add	the	money	advantage	to	the	equation.
TABLE	1.1.	Predicting	Obama	Two-Party	Vote
Finally,	in	chapter	13,	we	will	ask	what	difference,	if	any,	campaign	messages	made,	over	and
above	the	effects	of	party	identification,	ideology,	incumbent	popularity,	and	perception	of	the
economy.	We	will	also	ask	what	effect,	if	any,	campaign	communication	had	on	perceptions	of
the	economy	and	the	candidates’	ability	to	handle	it.
A	few	points	of	note:	First,	in	this	model,	party	identification	and	ideology	are	strong
predictors	of	how	individuals	say	they	voted.41	Approval	of	Bush’s	handling	his	job	as
president	and	voting	for	Bush	in	2004	produced	equally	strong	effects	in	the	model.	This
suggests,	as	we	will	discuss	in	chapter	2,	that	President	Bush	played	a	large	role	in	this
election.	The	respondent’s	assessment	of	his	or	her	personal	economic	condition	or	national
economic	conditions	did	not	predict	an	Obama	vote	in	this	model.	There	are	a	few	reasons	for
this.	First,	83.9	percent	of	respondents	reported	that	their	economic	situation	was	either	the
same	as	or	worse	than	it	was	a	year	ago.	With	such	a	high	ceiling	effect	and	a	lack	of	variance
within	this	predictor	variable,	meaningful	relationships	are	difficult	to	tease	out	statistically.
Second,	we	are	looking	at	individual-level	data	and	perceptions	of	the	economy,	not	an
aggregate	economic	indicator.	Political	scientist	Gerald	H.	Kramer	noted	many	discrepancies
between	macro-	and	micro-level	studies	linking	the	economy	to	vote	choice	and	argued	that
aggregate-level	time-series	analyses	produce	better	results.	In	other	words,	the	individual-
level	data	reported	here	may	not	detect	the	economy’s	role	in	the	outcome.	We	did	find	a
moderate	correlation	at	the	aggregate	level.	However,	our	economic	indicator	did	not	produce
a	lagged	effect	on	voting	behavior,	suggesting	that	although	these	two	variables	may	move
together,	shifts	in	economic	conditions	do	not	appear	to	precede	and	influence	votes	for
Obama.42*
As	we	will	show	in	chapter	8,	the	economy	was	at	play	in	this	election,	even	though	we	do
not	show	statistical	evidence	for	that	here.	In	a	later	chapter,	we	will	suggest	that	perceptions
of	the	candidates’	abilities	to	handle	the	economy	were	directly	linked	to	vote	choice	in	the
presence	of	controls.
One	explanation	for	the	minimal	net	effect	of	campaign	communication	may	of	course	be
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that	two	equally	skilled	and	comparably	financed	teams	cancel	out	the	effects	of	each	other’s
messages	and	media.43	Messages	may	have	specific,	shortlived	influences	on	certain	groups	of
people,	but	when	taken	together	the	net	effect	of	all	campaign	communication	from	both	parties
on	an	election	outcome	may	be	limited.
If	campaigns	do	matter,	some	surmise	that	it	may	be	by	activating	such	“fundamentals”	as
perception	of	the	strength	of	the	economy	and	of	party	identification	and	political	ideology.	In
other	words,	campaigns	may	serve	simply	to	vivify	existing	voter	preferences	or,	in	the
phrasing	of	political	scientists	Andrew	Gelman	and	Gary	King,44	foster	“enlightened
preferences.”	Echoing	Gelman	and	King,	political	scientist	Thomas	Holbrook	found	that
campaigns	basically	provide	voters	with	information	that	helps	them	align	with	the	candidate
to	whom	they	were	predisposed	all	along.45
The	communication	effects	that	have	been	located	have	in	general	been	minor	and,	as	such,
not	likely	to	undermine	the	standard	models’	predictions.	So,	for	example,	Bartels	found	small
changes	in	percent	of	vote	due	to	priming	in	the	1980	and	1996	elections46	and	also	identified
small	instances	of	persuasion	effects	on	candidates’	image	in	1980,	1984,	and	1988.	He
concludes,	“While	persuasion	effects	of	this	magnitude	are	clearly	large	enough	to	be
electorally	significant	under	the	right	circumstances,	they	are	also	clearly	small	enough	to	be
roughly	consistent	with	aggregated-level	evidence	that	‘the	outcome	of	recent	elections	can	be
predicted	within	a	few	percentage	points	in	the	popular	vote,	based	on	events	that	have
occurred	before	Election	Day.’	”47
Before	we	move	to	chapters	on	the	overarching	themes	of	the	2008	general	election,	it	is
important	that	we	note	that	messages	and	money	aren’t	factors	in	the	forecasting	models	that
correctly	predicted	more	than	two	months	before	Election	Day	that	Obama	would	win
handily.48	Much	of	the	past	research	on	the	impact	of	campaigns	assumes	that	during	the
general	election	the	two	major-party	candidates	are	running	campaigns	with	equal	resources
and	skill.	Under	those	circumstances	we	would	expect	the	communication	of	each	side	to
simply	cancel	out	the	effects	of	the	other.49	Nor	did	the	2008	models	anticipate	the	collapse	of
the	U.S.	economy	in	mid-September,	a	change	that	should	have	widened	the	gap	separating	the
Democratic	ticket’s	final	vote	total	from	that	of	its	Republican	counterpart.
With	an	estimated	$5.3	billion	spent	by	candidates,	political	parties,	and	interest	groups,
the	2008	campaign	was	the	costliest	in	U.S.	history.50	If	equally	distributed	between	the	two
major	presidential	campaigns,	past	research	suggests	that	the	simple	fact	of	heavy	spending
wouldn’t	affect	outcome.	However,	hamstrung	by	McCain’s	decision	to	accept	federal
financing,	in	the	2008	general	election,	the	Republicans	were	swamped	by	a	message	tsunami
from	a	campaign	able	to	outspend	them	nationally	and	in	virtually	every	battleground	state.	In
other	words,	the	financial	advantage	resided	on	the	same	side	as	the	structural	one.	To
compound	Obama’s	advantage,	he	also	ran	what	even	his	opponents	characterized	as	an
almost	flawless	general	election	campaign,	while,	as	we	will	show	in	later	chapters,	McCain
and	his	running	mate	stumbled	at	key	points	in	the	general	election.	We	wonder	why	the
Obama	spending	and	tactical	advantage	didn’t	widen	the	margin	between	the	two	candidates
beyond	the	forecasters’	predictions.	By	the	end	of	the	book,	we	hope	to	have	provided	a
preliminary	answer	to	the	question	of	whether	the	Obama	campaign’s	saturation	of	the	paid
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media	affected	the	disposition	to	vote	for	Obama	in	the	general	election.	And	did	the	messages
purchased	with	that	money	matter?
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